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HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM
COMING TO EUROPE: LESSONS FROM
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Alexandros Seretakis *
ABSTRACT
Hedge fund activists are the bright new hope of the shareholder
empowerment movement. Free from conflicts of interest and with highpowered compensation incentives, activist hedge funds are shaking up
corporate boardrooms. The recent surge in activism has provoked criticism
against activist investors portrayed as short-term agitators seeking to
obtain short-term profits at the expense of long-term value. Although the
view of hedge fund activists as short-term speculators has been discredited
by empirical evidence, innovative tactics employed by hedge funds allow
them to secretly accumulate large stakes in target companies within a short
time period. In response to the adverse effects of activist tactics on market
transparency and fairness, European regulators have tightened disclosure
obligations for major blockholders, with U.S. regulators following suit.
While calls for tightening disclosure obligations in the United States have
been accompanied by a lively debate between proponents and opponents of
tighter disclosure rules, the amendment of disclosure rules in Europe was
not preceded by any meaningful empirical analysis of the benefits and costs
of tighter disclosure rules. The result is that current European disclosure
rules tilt the balance heavily against activist investors seeking to operate in
Europe. In line with developments across the other side of the Atlantic, the
present Article urges European regulators to reconsider the current
disclosure regime by conducting a careful empirical analysis of their
benefits for market transparency and fairness and their costs on
shareholders and companies as a result of a reduction in the incidence of
activist shareholdings.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a tectonic shift in the power struggle between
corporate insiders and shareholders. 1 Shareholder empowerment has even
led scholars to conclude that the shareholder-manager agency cost problem
generated by the separation of ownership and control has been largely
resolved. 2 One of the reasons behind this development is the rise of a new
breed of aggressive shareholder activists: hedge funds. 3 Armed with a
growing war chest reaching $65.5 billion for U.S. funds and the support of
proxy advisory firms and traditional institutional investors such as mutual

1. See Corporate Governance: Shareholders at the Gates, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013, at 63,
available at http://www.economist.com/news/business/21573134-americas-proxy-season-will-pitmanagement-against-owners-never-shareholders. Indeed, the number of proxy contests has surged
from an average of seventeen per year during 1979–94 to fifty-five per year from 1994–2008. See
Vyacheslav Fos, The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests 1 (Sept. 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1705707.
2. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1907, 1910 (2013) (claiming that changes in market and corporate practices have brought
the problem arising out of the separation of ownership and control under control). Berle and
Means first observed that the separation of ownership and control in modern publicly held
corporations gives rise to an agency problem as the interests of dispersed shareholder-principals
and manager-agents diverge. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301, 304 (1983). Jensen and
Meckling defined the costs generated by this separation as “agency costs.” Agency costs include
the costs of monitoring managers by shareholders, the bonding costs incurred by managers, and
the residual loss incurred by shareholders. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
308 (1976).
3. See Rock, supra note 2, at 1922.
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funds and pension funds, 4 activist hedge funds are increasing their clout
inside corporate boardrooms. Household names such as Apple,
McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Hess Corporation—previously out of the reach
of activist investors, who lacked the financial resources to amass a
sufficiently large stake to influence multibillion-dollar companies—have
become targets of hedge fund activists, with hedge funds succeeding in
changing their operational performance or corporate governance. 5
Even though the roots of hedge fund activism can be traced back to the
corporate raiders and U.S. takeover boom of the 1970s and 1980s, 6 and
although the United States remains the most important market for activists,
with U.S. funds dominating the global landscape, 7 hedge fund activism has
been spreading in Europe, particularly after 2000.8 Shareholder capitalism
advocated by hedge funds has been shaking the traditionally insiderdominated European corporate system. For example, activists have
demanded the break-up of Dutch financial institution ABN AMRO, 9
pressured the Italian oil company ENI to restructure its operations, 10
launched a proxy fight against the management of French multinational

4. See Jessica Toonkel & Soyoung Kim, Activist Investors Find Allies in Mutual, Pension
Funds, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2013, 11:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-fundsactivist-idUSBRE9380DU20130409.
5. See Chris Burritt & Katherine Burton, Bill Ackman Sells McDonald’s Stake After Stock
Surges, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2007, 16:08), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=aZ6kcnn5qqUo (reporting activist investor Bill Ackman’s successful pressure
on McDonald’s to sell assets and increase distributions to shareholders); Michael J. de la Merced,
How Elliott and Hess Settled a Bitter Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 16, 2013, 9:11
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/hess-and-elliott-settle-fight-over-companys-board/
(discussing the proxy battle and eventual settlement between Hess’s management and hedge fund
Elliott Management); David Englander, Appetizing Change on the Menu, BARRON’S (Feb. 9,
2013),
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748704372504578284040427077104
.html (discussing the transformation of fast food chain Wendy’s under the control of activist
investor Nelson Peltz); Ben Fox Rubin, Einhorn Sues Apple over Preferred Stock Plan, WALL ST.
J.
(Feb.
7,
2013,
1:47
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424127887323452204578289811591849522.html (detailing the pressure exerted by
activist David Einhorn over Apple to return its huge cash pile to shareholders).
6. Corporate raiders such as Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz, and T. Boone Pickens gained notoriety
during their heyday in the 1980s for acquiring controlling stakes in undervalued companies,
aggressively using debt finance and their power to replace boards of directors and force
companies to break up. See generally KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE
HOSTILE TAKEOVER (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1988).
7. Shareholder Activism Review 2012, ACTIVIST INSIGHT, 1 (Jan. 2013),
http://www.activistinsight.com/research/Activist%20Insight%20-%20Annual%20Activism%
20Review%202012.pdf.
8. See Europe’s Revolting Shareholders, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2001, at 63, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/620394.
9. Hedge Fund Calls for Break-Up of ABN Amro, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 21, 2007,
7:43 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/hedge-fund-calls-for-break-up-of-abn-amro/.
10. Liam Moloney & Benoît Faucon, Activist Investor Says Eni Breakup Would Add Value,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125192824412581143
.html.
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Atos, 11 and succeeded in blocking Deutsche Boerse’s attempts to take over
the London Stock Exchange and oust its CEO. 12
The recent surge and growing success of hedge fund activism 13 have
provoked a backlash against activism from influential corporate lawyers, 14
legal academics, 15 politicians, 16 business journalists, 17 and prominent
judges. 18 Activists have been criticized as short-term speculators destroying
long-term value and compromising market transparency by exploiting
archaic disclosure rules allowing them to secretly accumulate influential
stakes in target companies, 19 decoupling economic ownership from voting
rights through the use of derivatives. 20 In response to a petition filed by
11. Dana Cimilluca, Chaos Surrounds Atos, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2008, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121149152806915431.html.
12. For an excellent overview of this landmark shareholder revolution and its implications for
German corporate governance, see Sudi Sudarsanam & Tim Broadhurst, Corporate Governance
Convergence in Germany Through Shareholder Activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse Bid for
London Stock Exchange, 16 J. MGMT. & GOV. 235 (2012).
13. See Toonkel & Kim, supra note 4.
14. See Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the
Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:22 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-thecompany-wreck-the-economy/.
15. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255 (2008).
16. Franz Müntefering, an influential German politician, famously described hedge funds as
“swarms of locusts that fall on companies, stripping them bare before moving on.” See Locust,
Pocus—German Capitalism, ECONOMIST, May 7, 2005, at 75, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/3935994.
17. Ira M. Millstein, Re-Examining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:52 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/re-examiningboard-priorities-in-an-era-of-activism/; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Shareholder Democracy Can Mask
Abuses, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 25, 2013, 9:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02
/25/shareholder-democracy-can-mask-abuses/.
18. See Jack Jacobs, Patient Capital: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2011); Leo E. Strine, One Fundamental Corporate Governance
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1 (2010).
19. Martin Lipton, Important Questions About Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu
/corpgov/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-activist-hedge-funds/.
20. See Beneficial Ownership of Equity Derivatives and Short Positions—A Modest Proposal
to Bring the 13D Reporting System into the 21st Century, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
(Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.15395
.08.pdf [hereinafter Beneficial Ownership]. Henry Hu and Bernard Black were the first to explore
and conceptualize the phenomenon of equity and risk decoupling. Pursuant to Hu and Black, risk
and equity decoupling can be broken down into “empty voting” and “hidden (morphable)
ownership.” Empty voting refers to a situation where a person has greater voting than economic
ownership. In contrast, any person who has greater economic than voting ownership is referred to
as a “hidden owner” and his or her ownership as “hidden ownership.” See Henry T. C. Hu &
Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 811, 812 (2006); Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling
and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008); Henry T. C. Hu
& Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership:
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007).
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prominent U.S. law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz voicing the
abovementioned concerns, 21 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(the SEC) is currently considering the amendment and modernization of
disclosure requirements for outside blockholders. 22 Opponents of the
petition point to the beneficial role of outside blockholders and especially
activist hedge funds, warn about the chilling effect of the amendments on
activism, and call on the SEC to carefully balance their costs and benefits. 23
Across the Atlantic, individual European countries have already tightened
their disclosure rules for major shareholders, with the European
Commission having recently adopted amendments to Directive
2004/109/EC (the Directive or Transparency Directive) governing
disclosure of major shareholdings. 24 Alarmed by the activities of activists,
European regulators hastily tightened disclosure rules for outside
blockholders without considering the beneficial effects of activist investors
and the crucial role that disclosure requirements play in incentivizing
outside blockholders. As Gilson and Gordon have argued, current European
and U.S. legislative developments alike should be understood as efforts to
impose a novel defensive mechanism at a time when activists are gaining
increased support by institutional investors.25
The aim of this Article is to offer a critique against the current
European disclosure rules for major shareholdings for failing to adequately
balance on the one hand the beneficial effects of activism and the adverse
21. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 7,
2011) [hereinafter Letter from Wachtell, Lipton], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions
/2011/petn4-624.pdf.
22. See Beneficial Ownership Reporting, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF. (Oct. 2013),
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=3235-AK42.
Blockholders who amass a stake of above five percent of voting rights and intend to actively
influence the governance of the target are required to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC. The
information contained in a Schedule 13D filing includes a declaration of intentions by the
shareholder crossing the threshold. The blockholder must describe the purpose of the acquisition
of shares of the issuer and any plans that would result in certain extraordinary transactions such as
a merger, reorganization, liquidation of the issuer, a sale of a material amount of assets of the
issuer, a change in the dividend policy of the issuer, and any plans to change the composition of
its board of directors. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2014); Schedule 13D, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
23. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 59–60 (2012).
24. Council Directive 2013/50/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 294) [hereinafter Transparency Directive
Amendments]; Council Directive 2004/109/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 December 2004 on the Harmonization of Transparency Requirements in Relation to
Information about Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and
Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) [hereinafter Harmonization of Transparency
Directive].
25. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 904–05, 907,
911–12 (2013); see also Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership
Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund Activism in Italy and Germany, and Its
Evolution, 10 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 328, 339–40 (2013).
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impact of tighter disclosure rules on it and on the other hand the need for
safeguarding market transparency. Part I examines the key role that hedge
funds play in modern capital markets and corporate governance and
describes the demands and tactics used by activists to achieve their goals.
Part II explores the promises and perils of hedge fund activism. Empirical
studies have documented the beneficial effects of hedge fund activism on
corporate governance and performance, casting doubt on the popular image
of activists as short-term agitators. Nonetheless, the tactics used by activists
to accumulate their stakes often compromise market transparency and
fairness. Part III explains the crucial role that disclosure rules play in
incentivizing hedge funds to engage in activism and critiques the current
European disclosure regimes as failing to adequately balance the beneficial
effects of activism against the need to enhance market transparency. In line
with calls by U.S. academics stressing the necessity of empirical analysis
before proceeding with the tightening of disclosure obligation for major
blockholders in the United States, Part III also urges European regulators to
reconsider the current disclosure obligations imposed on activist
shareholders and conduct a careful empirical analysis of the benefits and
costs of tighter disclosure obligations. 26
I. HEDGE FUND ACTIVISTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. HEDGE FUNDS AS GOVERNANCE ARBITRAGEURS 27
Modern shareholder activism began in the United States during the
1970s and 1980s, with individual investors such as Carl Icahn and Nelson
Peltz amassing controlling positions and aggressively agitating for actions
that would grant them short-term gains. 28 Faced with collective action
problems, however, individual shareholders largely abstained from
becoming involved in corporate governance. 29 With the U.S. hostile
takeover wave fading away in the late 1980s, 30 attention turned to the other
26. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 59–60.
27. The term “governance arbitrageurs” was coined by Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at

896.

28. See generally KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra note 6.
29. Two related problems make shareholders passive and rationally apathetic in widely held

firms. First, while a shareholder who wishes to become involved in corporate governance must
bear the costs of its efforts, including monitoring costs and the costs of launching a proxy
campaign, it receives only a pro rata share of the gains if its actions are successful, allowing other
shareholders to free-ride on its efforts. Second, knowing that its vote will not affect the outcome,
an individual shareholder does not have an incentive to carefully consider a proposal submitted to
a vote. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 63–89 (1991); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 520, 526–30 (1990).
30. The U.S. takeover boom lasted from 1984 until 1989 and was characterized by a surge in
hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts. See PATRICK GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS 57–63 (5th ed. 2011). Hostile takeovers were viewed as the
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powerful players in capital markets: institutional investors, and most
prominently, mutual funds and pension funds. 31 It was argued that
institutional investors as outside blockholders had the incentives to engage
in monitoring and intervene in the companies in which they invested. 32
Nonetheless, the promise remained unfulfilled. Nearly two decades
afterwards, researchers concluded that the impact of institutional investors
on corporate governance and performance was negligible.33
Legal barriers, conflicts of interest, and a business model fundamentally
incompatible with activism make institutional investor intervention
“incidental” and “ex post.” 34 Regulatory constraints include diversification
ultimate disciplinary mechanism against managerial incompetence and self-interest. See Henry G.
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965).
Multiple factors contributed to the end of the takeover boom, including the economic slowdown
starting in 1989; the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, an investment bank specialized in
financing takeovers; the enactment of anti-takeover statutes by state legislatures; and the
endorsement of takeover defenses by the courts of the state of Delaware, where the majority of
public corporations have been incorporated following a series of landmark court decisions. See
Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Theory and the Law and Economics Movement, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW 216 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds.,
2012).
31. Bernard S. Black, Agent Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1990). Institutional
investors and especially mutual funds and pension funds have come to dominate modern capital
markets. In 2009, over 50% of U.S. public equities were held by institutional investors. See
Matteo Tonello & Stephan Rabimov, The 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset
Allocation and Portfolio Composition 22 tbl.10 (Conference Bd., Research Report No. R-146810-RR, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707512. Institutional ownership is also
prevalent in the United Kingdom, reaching 80% of listed equities and rapidly spreading in
continental Europe, reaching for instance 25% in Italy and 29% in Germany. See Paolo Santella et
al., A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Obstacles to Institutional Investor Activism in the EU
and in the US 12 (July 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137491.
32. A large shareholder is able to spread the costs associated with monitoring and intervention
over a larger share and capture higher gains from its intervention. Furthermore, its substantial
voting rights allow it to pressure and potentially remove management through a proxy fight or
takeover. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 461, 461 (1986); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 754 (1997).
33. As a legal academic concluded in 1998, “[t]he evidence to date suggests that activism,
American style, has had little effect on firm performance.” See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Similarly, in their survey of
empirical studies regarding institutional shareholder activism, Gillan and Starks conclude that
activism has little impact on improving long-term stock performance or the operating performance
of targeted companies. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder
Activism in the United States, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2007, at 55. In their examination of
shareholder proposals submitted in Europe, Cziraki, Renneboog, and Szilagyi find that proposal
submissions are rare in Europe and are associated with negative market reactions. See Peter
Cziraki et al., Shareholder Activism Through the Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective, 16
EUR. FIN. MGMT. 738 (2010).
34. Traditional institutional investor activism seeks to safeguard the value of pre-existing
investments. Thus, institutional investors will engage in activism only in case a company already
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requirements for mutual and pension funds 35 and requirements for daily
liquidity for open-ended mutual fund investors, 36 inhibiting their ability to
invest in large illiquid positions. Conflicts of interest are particularly severe
for pension funds, with public pension funds subject to political pressure
and private pension fund managers seeking to obtain and maintain business
from their corporate clients. 37 The fundamental explanation for the
reluctance of mutual and pension funds to invest in activism is their
business model, which prioritizes the quest for relative returns. 38 Mutual
fund and pension fund managers are judged against their performance
relative to their peers. 39 A manager engaging in activism must bear all of
the costs of the effort while sharing the gains with its competitors who hold
shares in the target company. 40 As a result, the manager’s performance
relative to its competitors will decline. Thus, even though activism would
increase the value of the company and benefit beneficiaries, managers are
hesitant to engage in it.
It is this governance shortfall that hedge funds as governance
arbitrageurs seek to exploit. With institutional investors paralyzed and
unable to invest in profitable activism, activists specialize in searching for
part of the institution’s portfolio is either underperforming or in need of a shake-up in its corporate
governance. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 52, 56 (2011); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069 (2007).
35. For instance, the Investment Company Act of 1940 prohibits mutual funds that wish to
advertise themselves as diversified from putting more than 5% of their regulated assets in the
securities of any one issuer and including in the regulated part of their portfolios more than 10%
of the stock of any company. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (2012). Similarly, by virtue of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), private pension funds are required
to be diversified. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104; see also Mark Roe, A Political Theory of American
Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 19–21, 24–25 (1991) (summarizing the various
diversification limits imposed on U.S. mutual funds and private pension funds). Similar
requirements are imposed for EU mutual funds by the Undertakings for Collective Investments in
Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS Directive). See, e.g., Directive 2009/65/EC, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in
Transferable Securities (UCITS), art. 52 § 1(a), 2009 O.J. (L 302), 32, 63 [hereinafter UCITS
Directive] (prohibiting mutual funds from investing more than 5% of their assets in shares of the
same issuer). For individual European countries’ regulations regarding diversification
requirements for pension funds, see ORG. FOR ECON. DEV. & COOPERATION, ANNUAL SURVEY
OF
INVESTMENT
REGULATION
OF
PENSION
FUNDS
(2013),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/InvRegPensionFunds2013.pdf.
36. For European regulations, see UCITS Directive, supra note 35, art. 1 § 2(b); for U.S.
regulations, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1).
37. For an excellent investigation of the conflicts of interests plaguing institutional investors,
see Black, supra note 29, at 595–608.
38. JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION
MAKING: FINAL REPORT 39–42 (2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads
/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-finalreport.pdf.
39. See id. at 42.
40. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 890–93.
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undervalued 41 and poorly governed firms and agitating for operational or
governance improvements as outside blockholders. Unconstrained by
restrictive regulation, 42 with high-powered performance incentives 43 and
free of conflicts of interest, hedge funds are able to amass large illiquid
positions falling short of control blocks and typically below ten percent of
target stock, 44 engaging in costly and time-consuming efforts to propose
and aid in the implementation of changes in target companies. 45 In contrast
to traditional institutional investor activism, hedge funds invest in order to
engage in activism. 46 Their activism, therefore, is “strategic” and “ex
ante.” 47 Belonging to the group of value investors, 48 hedge fund activists
41. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1741 (2008); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4
FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009) (finding that activists target firms with low market values
relative to their book values).
42. Hedge funds are not subject to any diversification requirements, allowing them to
concentrate their investments in a limited number of influential positions in target companies. The
recent surge in assets under management has allowed activists to amass influential stakes in everbigger companies. See Anupreeta Das & Sharon Terlep, Activist Fights Draw More Attention,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Mar.
18,
2013,
11:23
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424127887324392804578360370704215446.html. Furthermore, in contrast to openended mutual funds, hedge fund managers grant investors limited withdrawal rights. Activist
funds lock up investor capital for an initial period of eighteen months to two years, with several
funds adopting longer lock-ups. See Azam Ahmed, For Activist Funds, a Long-Term Approach to
Investing, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 20, 2010, 7:45 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010
/12/20/for-activist-funds-a-long-term-approach-to-investing/; David Nissenbaum & Maria
Gabriela Bianchini, Activist Fund Structuring, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, 2 (2005),
http://www.srz.com/files/News/dc23f4b9-405a-429e-be30-793a1098068a/Presentation
/NewsAttachment/71f8978a-ad95-4fef-b535-8629c46fe223/filesfilesai-spring-05-nissenbaum.pdf.
Furthermore, hedge funds allow investor withdrawals only during a quarterly or semiannual
redemption period and after prior notice. Other mechanisms that hedge funds utilize to ensure
liquidity are gates on withdrawals, which limit the amount that can be withdrawn during any
redemption period to a specified percentage of the fund’s capital. Additionally, activists often
place illiquid investments in companies in a side pocket account. Investors are not allowed to
withdraw their capital from the side pocket until the investment is liquidated. See DAVID P.
STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY:
THE NEW PARADIGM 213–14 (2010).
43. While mutual funds are compensated on the basis of the assets under management, hedge
fund compensation consists of both a management fee, ranging from one to two percent of the
assets under management, and an incentive fee, usually set at twenty percent of the fund’s profits
and widely known as “carried interest.” Carried interest creates a powerful incentive for hedge
funds to seek absolute performance. See Ludwig Chincarini, Hedge Funds—An Introduction, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE EQUITY AND ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS
13, 24 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds., 2012).
44. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence
and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (2013) (examining all 13D filings by activist hedge funds in the
United States from 1994 until 2007 and finding that activists acquire an average stake of 8.8% and
median of 6.3%).
45. See infra note 158.
46. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 34.
47. Kahan & Rock, supra note 34.
48. Activists hold relatively few concentrated positions in target companies and rarely hedge
their positions. Their managers and employees are usually former investment bankers and research
analysts accustomed to fundamental analysis. The crucial difference between hedge fund activists
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conduct diligent research with the aim of spotting targets that will benefit
from intervention and identify the changes that will unlock shareholder
value. 49 The most common propositions of activists are a sale of the target,
return of excess cash, 50 sale or spin-offs of unrelated assets and refocusing
corporate strategy, 51 improvements in firm governance, 52 and changes in
the target’s long-term business plan. 53
B. GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS: VOICE OR EXIT?
1. Voice
In his landmark treatise, Hirschman emphasized that members of an
organization, be it a firm, a nation, or any other collective, have two options
when faced with a deterioration in the quality of the organization: either
exit, namely through withdrawal from the organization, or voice their
dissatisfaction and attempt to remedy the flaws in the organization by
communicating their own proposals. 54 It is for their ability to exercise voice
instead of selling their shares and voting with their feet by following the
practice known as the “Wall Street Walk” that hedge funds have been
praised.
Gantchev models hedge fund activism as a sequential process with
three different stages: demand negotiations, board representation, and proxy
and value investors, such as Warren Buffett, is their willingness to adopt an aggressive stance
against target management who refuse to implement their propositions. See William W. Bratton,
Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1383 (2007).
49. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 902.
50. Michael Jensen famously pointed to the agency costs generated by free cash flow, namely
cash flow in excess of that required for financing all positive net present value projects. Managers
will waste free cash flow in suboptimal projects or hold it on the firm’s balance sheet, insulating
themselves from the discipline of capital markets. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free
Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). Indeed,
empirical studies confirm that firms targeted by activists tend to be profitable but low-growth
firms with healthy operating cash flow and low payouts to shareholders. See Brav et al., Hedge
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, supra note 41, at 1753.
51. Deconglomerization gained traction during the 1970s and 1980s after the abysmal
performance of conglomerates created during the 1960s. A variety of studies have shown that
conglomerates are associated with a “diversification discount” reaching fifteen percent. See Philip
G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 59–60 (1995);
Henri Servaes, The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave, 51 J. FIN.
1201 (1996). Apart from demanding the break-up of conglomerates, activists also advocate the
sale or spin-off of unessential and underperforming divisions of a multidivisional firm operating in
a single industry. See Bratton, supra note 48, at 1392–93.
52. Increasingly, activists are demanding the dismantling of takeover defenses with the ardent
support of mainstream institutional investors. See Matteo Tonello, Poison Pills in 2011, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (April 3, 2011, 9:49 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/04/03/poison-pills-in-2011/.
53. See Bratton, supra note 48, at 1390–97; Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate
Governance and Firm Performance, supra note 41, at 1741–44.
54. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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fight. 55 An activism campaign begins with the filing of a regulatory form
announcing the crossing of a specified ownership threshold and the
intentions of the activist. 56 Then follows the demand negotiations stage,
where the activist communicates its demands and negotiates directly with
management. 57 If its demands are rejected, the activist requests board
representation and threatens to launch a proxy fight. 58 If management still
resists, then the activist moves to the final and most aggressive stage: the
commencement of a proxy fight. 59 Crucially, the activist lacking a
controlling position in the target has to gather the support of other
shareholders—mainly institutional investors. 60 As Gilson and Gordon note,
after publicly announcing its presence, the activist will start a nonpublic
campaign seeking to convince institutional investors to support its
demands. 61 Thus, the activist will move from a less to a more
confrontational stage only after it makes a positive assessment about the
likelihood of support from traditional institutional investors, with the last
stage—a proxy fight—being in essence an official referendum on the
activist’s proposals. 62
2. Exit
While exit has been treated as an alternative to activism exercised
through voice and therefore inconsistent with it, 63 a recent strand of
academic research has recognized exit as another powerful governance
55. Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential
Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 613–14 (2013).
56. Id.
57. Id. Activists targeting continental European companies, which are often controlled by
majority shareholders, tend to cooperate with controlling shareholders. Furthermore, the
engagement is usually private, with the proxy fight stage being infrequent. See Marco Becht et al.,
The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study 3 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 098/2008, 2013), available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools
/csom_sites/finance/Franks-031313b.pdf.
58. Gantchev, supra note 55.
59. Id. at 614.
60. See Ruth Sullivan, Traditional Investors Adopt Activism, FIN. TIMES (May 5, 2013, 6:14
AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/62d5ea16-b253-11e2-a388-00144feabdc0.html. Institutional
ownership in the top 1000 U.S. corporations has reached an average of seventy-three percent. See
Tonello & Rabimov, supra note 31.
61. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 899–901. Indeed, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas
find that activists tend to target companies with high institutional ownership. See Brav et al.,
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, supra note 41, at 1753.
62. Management will also make the same assessment in deciding whether to accept or reject
the activist’s demands. See Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance, supra note 41, at 1764.
63. See, e.g., John Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991) (arguing that liquidity impairs activism and voice by
making it easier for institutional investors to immediately sell their shares and follow the “Wall
Street Walk”); see also IRIS H-Y CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND ANATOMY OF SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM 7 (2010); see generally Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J.
FIN. ECON. 31 (1993).
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mechanism. 64 Sales of stock by dissatisfied blockholders hurt the manager
that has a substantial amount of its compensation tied to stock price
performance 65 ex post by lowering stock prices and consequently its wealth.
Ex ante, the threat of exit plays a disciplinary role by inducing the manager
to enhance firm value. 66 In contrast with previous literature that treats
liquidity as harmful for impairing activism by making exit easier,67 viewing
exit as a governance mechanism implies that liquidity is in fact beneficial.
First, liquidity encourages initial block formation by allowing a blockholder
to buy additional shares without causing any price impact. 68 Second, it
facilitates more trading by blockholders and consequently strengthens
governance through exit. 69 Indeed, Edmans, Fang, and Zur, using a sample
of activist hedge fund block acquisitions from 1995 to 2010, find that
liquidity increases the likelihood of block acquisition. 70 Although it reduces
the likelihood that the activist files a Schedule 13D rather than a 13G, thus
inhibiting voice, liquidity encourages governance through exit. 71
Confirming the governance role of exit, they find that the filing of a 13G is

64. See, e.g., Anat. R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder
Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2445 (2009); Alex Edmans, Blockholder
Trading, Market Efficiency and Managerial Myopia, 64 J. FIN. 2481 (2009); Alex Edmans &
Gustavo Manso, Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple
Blockholders, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2395 (2011).
65. The rise of pay-for performance can be traced back to the 1980s and recognition of the
powerful role that equity-based compensation plays in incentivizing managers to act in the
shareholders’ interests. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). It is now an indisputable fact that a
substantial amount of executive compensation is either granted in stock and stock options or is
equity-linked. See Martin J. Conyon et al., The Executive Compensation Controversy—A
Transatlantic Analysis 47 (Inst. for Compensation Studies, Working Paper No. 002, 2011),
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ics/5/ (finding that at the end of 2006, the
median U.S. CEO held stock and options worth 9.7 times his or her cash compensation, with the
ratio for European CEOs being 4.4).
66. Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 19573, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers
/w19573.pdf.
67. See LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMICS BATTLE AMONG
JAPAN, EUROPE AND AMERICA (1993); Coffee, supra note 63; Michael Porter, Capital
Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, 70 HARV. BUS. REV. 65 (1992).
68. Ernst Maug, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Tradeoff Between Liquidity and
Control?, 53 J. FIN. 65 (1998).
69. Alex Edmans et al., The Effect of Liquidity on Governance, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 1443,
1444 (2013).
70. Id. at 1457–60.
71. The effect is especially strong for firms with high managerial incentives. See id. at 1460–
61. A Schedule 13D is filed by a blockholder who intends to become active in the governance of
the company, while a Schedule 13G is filed by a blockholder who holds the securities as passive
investment and does not intend to change or influence control over the issuer. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-1 (2014).
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associated with positive abnormal returns around the filing date and
improved operating performance after the filing. 72
II. THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM
A. THE PROMISE OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM
Law and finance literature has univocally recognized the benefits of
large outside blockholders, and especially activist hedge funds, in
improving corporate governance and operational performance of target
companies.73 By amassing a large stake, blockholders are able to spread the
costs of their activism and reap higher gains from their efforts. 74
Consequently, blockholders are sufficiently incentivized to gather costly
information, engage in monitoring, and invest in activism. Ex post, a
blockholder will discipline management for suboptimal performance. Ex
ante, the threat of a blockholder acquiring a stake motivates management to
exert greater efforts and improve performance. 75 Crucially, the gains from
monitoring or successful intervention will be reaped by all shareholders of
the target company. 76 It is here where modern activists diverge from the
“raiders” of the 1980s, who sought to take control of the company, then
strip it of its assets or convince the company to buy back their stock at a
large market premium, keeping the gains solely for themselves. 77 What is
more, in cases of corporations dominated by controlling shareholders where
the agency cost shifts from being one between managers and shareholders
to one between controlling and minority shareholders, 78 activist initiatives
72. Edmans et al., supra note 69, at 1461–66. The stock price spike represents the market’s
anticipation of governance benefits from the presence of a blockholder who can exert governance
through exit. This anticipation is confirmed by subsequent improved operating performance.
73. See generally Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, supra note 41.
74. Shleifer & Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, supra note 32; Shleifer &
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, supra note 32, at 753–54.
75. Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 12.
76. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 50.
77. See John Coffee, supra note 63. The practice of greenmail by “raiders” was prevalent
during the takeover wars of the 1980s. Raiders would buy a large stake in the target company and
under the threat of a hostile takeover coerce the target into buying back the raiders’ stake at a
substantial premium to the market price without extending the offer to all target shareholders. See
David Manry & David Stangeland, Greenmail: A Brief History, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 217, 222
(2001).
78. In a concentrated ownership structure, the controlling shareholder will have both the
incentives and the power to discipline management and minimize the agency costs between
shareholders and management. However, the controlling shareholder will have its own interests
and may use its control rights in order to expropriate other shareholders. See REINIER R.
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 22 (2004); Shleifer & Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, supra note 32, at
758. The standard narrative views the dispersed ownership model prevailing in the United States
and United Kingdom as the exception, with concentrated ownership being the rule around the
world and especially in Continental Europe. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (the seminal paper on this topic). Nonetheless, this view
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are aimed at curbing private benefit extraction by controlling
shareholders. 79 Hedge fund activists seek to discipline controlling
shareholders by cooperating with fellow minority shareholders and utilizing
the protective tools granted by the legal regime to minority shareholders. 80
Consistent with the theory that highlights the beneficial role of activists
for shareholders, various studies have univocally documented significant
positive abnormal returns upon the announcement of the presence of an
activist hedge fund.81 The price increase reflects the market’s expectation of
of the world is rather outdated. The spread of globalization, the liberalization of capital flows, the
rise of institutional investors, and regulatory changes have fundamentally transformed corporate
structures in Continental Europe. For instance, Germany, once considered a hallmark of
concentrated ownership, is increasingly moving towards a dispersed ownership structure.
According to the Federal Agency for Public Education, German companies included in the DAX30 index and representing Germany’s thirty largest companies by market capitalization exhibit an
average free-floating share capital of 82.6%. See Aktionärsstruktur von DAX-Unternehmen,
BUNDESZENTRALE FÜR POLITISCHE BILDUNG (Sept. 25, 2010), http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen
/zahlen-und-fakten/globalisierung/52596/aktionaersstruktur-dax. For similar changes in the French
corporate governance model, see Michel Goyer & Dong Kwan Jung, Diversity of Institutional
Investors and Foreign Blockholdings in France: The Evolution of an Institutionally Hybrid
Economy, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 562 (2011); Michel Goyer, The Transformation of
Corporate
Governance
in
France,
BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
(Jan.
2003),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2003/1/01france%20goyer/goyer.pdf.
79. The term “private benefits of control” refers to some value that is enjoyed exclusively by
the controlling shareholders and is not shared with other shareholders. Alexander Dyck & Luigi
Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 537–41
(2004). One can distinguish between pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits of control.
Pecuniary private benefits involve the extraction or shifting of real resources from the company to
the controlling shareholder. Apart from outright theft consumption, pecuniary benefits can take
the form of related-party transactions, consumption of perquisites, or dilution of minority
shareholder interests. Non-pecuniary benefits, such as the social status achieved by the control of
a large corporation, are a form of psychic benefits that involve no real transfer of company
resources. See Pierre-Henri Conac et al., Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The
Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy, 4 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 491, 495–96
(2007); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1663–64 (2006).
80. See Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of
Concentrated Ownership and High Private Benefits of Control: The Case of Italy 22–31 (Eur.
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 225/2013, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325421 (documenting instances where hedge fund activists have sought
to curb the extraction of private benefits in Italian companies typically controlled by a major
shareholder). Activists have cooperated with other minority shareholders and utilized the legal
tools available in the Italian legal regime for the protection of minority shareholders. The demands
of hedge funds have ranged from changes in the company strategy, to suggesting or opposing
specific transactions and pushing for alteration of the financial structure or dividend policy of
firms. Id.
81. A large body of empirical work has firmly documented the initial price spike. In their
study of over 2000 activist interventions in the United States from 1994–2007, Bebchuk, Brav,
and Jiang find large average abnormal returns approximately 6% in a forty-day window around
the filing of a Schedule 13D announcing the presence of an activist hedge funds. See Lucian A.
Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Activism 16 (Columbia Bus. Sch., Research Paper No.
13-66, 2013), available at http://www.columbia.edu/~wj2006/HF_LTEffects.pdf. Similar results
are reached by other studies; see Brav et al., supra note 41, at 1729 (finding average abnormal
returns between 7–8% for activist interventions in the United States); Robin Greenwood &

452

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 8

improved firm value resulting from the activist’s involvement, adjusted for
the probability of success of its campaign. 82 Opponents of activism view the
initial price spike as a result of inefficient market pricing that fails to
incorporate the long-term costs of activism. 83 Therefore, one should expect
the positive disclosure abnormal returns to be followed by negative longterm stock returns, making shareholders worse off. Nonetheless, in their
comprehensive study of activist interventions in the United States from
1994–2007, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang examine stock returns in the five
years after the initial stock price increase and during the three-year period
following the activist’s exit, documenting no such pattern of negative
returns reversing the initial positive abnormal returns.84
The market’s expectation of increased firm value resulting from the
activist’s intervention is largely confirmed by subsequent improvements in
operational performance.85 The study by Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, using as
performance metrics the Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q, documents
that activists target companies whose operating performance at the time of
intervention trails that of their industry peers or their own historical levels. 86
Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 362 (2009) (examining
activism in the United States and documenting average abnormal returns around 3.5% over a
fifteen-day window); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge
Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187 (examining confrontational activist
interventions in the United States and documenting returns reaching 10.2% around a 13D filing).
Large abnormal returns have been documented for activist interventions in Europe as well. See
Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the
Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3094 (2009) (examining activist interventions from
the Hermes UK Focus Fund and finding positive abnormal returns around the announcement of
changes following the engagement); Marco Becht et al., Hedge Fund Activism in Europe (Eur.
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 283/2010, 2010), available at
http://www.ecgi.org/tcgd/2011/documents/Becht-Franks-Grant%20Hedge%20Fund%20Activism
%20in%20Europe%202010.pdf (analyzing a database of European activist interventions and
finding mean abnormal returns of 4.4% around the disclosure date); see also Bebchuk et al.,
supra, at 19–20 (examining a large database of shareholder activist interventions in North
America, Europe, and Japan and finding disclosure abnormal returns around 7.5%).
82. Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, supra
note 41, at 1757.
83. See Lipton, supra note 19.
84. See Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Activism, supra note 81. Indeed, studies have
found that the market not only correctly anticipates initial gains from intervention, but that it
actually undervalues the benefits conferred by activism and the probability of its success as well.
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 81, at 20–23; Greenwood & Schor, supra note 81, at 366–68.
85. Although many doubt the expertise and skill of hedge fund activist managers in improving
operations, one should note that directors nominated on a target’s board by activists are
predominantly successful executives having expertise in the relevant industry. See, e.g., Michael J.
de la Merced, Yahoo Shakes Up Its Board and Adds PayPal Co-Founder, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Dec. 13, 2012, 10:38 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/yahoo-said-to-plan-boardshake-up-adding-levchin/ (discussing activist Daniel Loeb’s push for including experienced
executives on Yahoo’s board and executive positions); de la Merced, supra note 5 (reporting
Elliott’s proxy fight with Hess’s management and the profile of Elliott’s slate consisting of
experienced, former high-level executives).
86. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Activism, supra note 81, at 7–13.
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Indeed, targets experience a constant decline in operating performance
during the three years prior to the engagement. 87 However, they markedly
outperform their peers during the five years following the intervention, with
operating performance exceeding the intervention-year level in each year. 88
The beneficial effects of activism are corroborated by Brav, Jiang, and Kim,
who use data about the performance of U.S. manufacturing plants owned by
firms targeted by hedge fund activists and find that the productivity of
target firms’ plants declines substantially during the two years prior to the
intervention and then rebounds sharply during the two years afterward. 89
Furthermore, underperforming plants sold after the activist intervention
experience a substantial increase in productivity and profitability in the
hands of the new owners. 90 These results indicate that activists are skilled at
efficiently reallocating corporate assets.
Contrary to the proposition that the value created by activism derives
from increased operating performance, Greenwood and Schor find in their
sample of activist interventions in the United States from 1993–2006 that
announcement returns to activism are significant, mainly in instances where
the target is acquired within eighteen months of the initial intervention.91 As
a result, they argue that the positive average abnormal returns reflect the
market’s expectation that the activist will put the firm in play and succeed
in getting the target acquired at a premium to the current stock price. 92
Thus, the real skill of activists lies in brokering deals. The evidence should
not be viewed negatively and should take into account the gains reaped by
target shareholders from selling at a premium to the market price and the
tendency of target management to resist a takeover.93
Activists are also increasingly successful in pushing for governance
changes in target companies. With the support of institutional investors,
hedge funds in the United States are increasingly agitating for the

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk and Product

Market Competition 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17517, 2011),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17517.pdf.
90. Id.
91. Greenwood & Schor, supra note 81, at 368–70.
92. Id. at 363.
93. A prominent example was Yahoo’s rejection of Microsoft’s hostile bid at a substantial
premium in 2008 under the leadership of Yahoo’s co-founder and then-imperial CEO, Jerry Yang.
Activist Carl Icahn pressured Yahoo to accept the offer under the threat of a proxy fight. Although
the deal collapsed, Icahn and another hedge fund investor, Daniel Loeb, agitated for governance
changes in Yahoo, including the resignation of Jerry Yang from the board of Yahoo and any
executive position with the company. See STEVEN DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN
TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 187–95 (2009);
Amir Efrati et al., Founder Severs Ties to Yahoo, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204555904577167251792053494.html.
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dismantling of takeover defenses or their subjection to a shareholder vote.94
Furthermore, in their studies of activist engagements, Klein and Zur, as well
as Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, find increases in leverage and the
payout ratio in target firms following the activist intervention, indicating
that hedge funds ameliorate the agency problem of free cash flow. 95
Additionally, hedge fund activism is associated with an increase in CEO
turnover rate and pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.96
B. THE DARK SIDE OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM
Critics of hedge fund activism view hedge funds as short-term
speculators who agitate for changes that will earn them a quick profit at the
expense of long-term value. 97 Holding their shares for a short time period,
so the argument goes, hedge funds are able to exit their investments at a
profit long before the negative consequences of their actions have
materialized, leaving employees and long-term shareholders worse off. 98 As
Leo Strine has observed, activists “can easily depart and not eat their own
cooking.” 99 Thus, activists exacerbate short-termism in financial markets,
which are increasingly dominated by short-term investors in search of quick
returns. 100

94. Various studies have associated takeover defenses with lower firm value. See Lucian
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005); Lucian
A. Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural
Experiments (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17127, 2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17127.pdf (finding that staggered boards lead to lower firm value).
See also Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783
(2009) (constructing an entrenchment index consisting of six provisions, including the adoption of
a staggered board and poison pill, and concluding that the entrenching provisions are correlated
with lower firm value). However, one should note that these studies do not prove a direct
causation between takeover defenses and lower firm value. Indeed, takeover defenses are
beneficial in cases where management can negotiate a better deal for shareholders as a result of its
increased negotiating power and has strong reasons to believe that the long-term value of the
company is higher than the current value placed by the bidder. A recent example was Airgas’s
strong resistance against Airproduct’s hostile bid. After Airproduct withdrew its offer, Airgas saw
a substantial increase in its stock price, indicating that management’s belief that Airproduct’s offer
was undervaluing the company was correct. See Steven Davidoff, Winners & Losers in the Airgas
Poison Pill Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 26, 2011, 12:44 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/who-won-in-the-airgas-poison-pill-case/.
95. See Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance,
supra note 41, at 1770–73; Klein & Zur, supra note 81, at 222–25.
96. See Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance,
supra note 41, at 1776.
97. See Lipton, supra note 14.
98. Millstein, supra note 17; Sorkin, supra note 17.
99. See Strine, supra note 18, at 8.
100. See Rebecca Darr & Judith Samuelson, Overcoming Short-Termism: A Call for a More
Responsible Approach to Investment and Business Management, ASPEN INST., 2–3 (Sept. 9,
2009),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf.
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However, as noted above, in their empirical study of hedge fund
interventions, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang find that contrary to claims that
activism is harmful for long-term firm value, activists are able to create
sustainable, long-term improvements in the company’s share price and
operational performance. 101 What is crucial to understand is that activist
hedge funds are not controlling shareholders able to impose their desired
changes in the company’s strategy or governance, but rather large
influential shareholders who invest in monitoring and proposing valueenhancing changes to other shareholders. 102 The shareholders on whose
support hedge funds count to implement their agenda are traditional
institutional investors—predominantly mutual funds and pension funds with
long-term investment horizons that hold shares for a long period of time. 103
Although mutual funds and pensions are reluctant to engage in activism,
they are increasingly adopting transparent voting policies and scrutinizing
proposals submitted for a vote. 104 What is more, the popular belief that
hedge fund activists are short-term investors holding stocks for a short
period of time does not correspond to reality. Indeed, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy,
and Thomas find an average holding period of twenty-two months for
activists targeting U.S. companies, 105 while Becht, Franks, and Grant report

101. See Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Activism, supra note 81.
102. Indeed, Bebchuk, Brav, Jackson, and Jiang document that the average activist stake

reaches 8.8%, with a median of 6.3%. See Bebcuk et al., supra note 44. Although the stake is large
enough to incentivize the activist to engage in activism, it is too small to guarantee the activist’s
prevalence in a proxy fight or the adoption of shareholder proposals submitted by him or her. This
is also true in cases where the activists seek to discipline a controlling shareholder. In order to
counteract the power of the controlling shareholder, the activists will often cooperate with other
shareholders. See, e.g., Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 80, at 22–31.
103. Despite the popular perception of ever-increasing turnover rates and diminishing holding
durations of equities, empirical evidence suggest that these changes are driven by a small subset of
hyperactive traders such as high-frequency traders. See Mark Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In
the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013). Indeed, Cremers, Pareek, and
Sautner find that institutional investor holding durations from 1985 until 2010 have in fact
increased over time from 1.2 years in 1985 to 1.5 years in 2010, with pension funds having the
longest duration, reaching approximately 1.7 years. See Martin Cremers et al., Stock Duration and
Misvaluation (Sept. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2190437.
104. See Toonkel & Kim, supra note 4. The shift in the way that institutional investors cast their
votes became evident when Lawrence Fink, the co-founder and CEO of Blackrock, the world’s
largest asset manager and one of the biggest shareholders of U.S. companies, wrote a letter to all
U.S. companies in which Blackrock was a shareholder. He warned the companies that they should
not assume that Blackrock was following the recommendations of proxy advisory firms blindly,
but rather was reaching its voting decisions on the basis of clear guidelines and its fiduciary
responsibilities to its investors. Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholdinggiant-is-quietly-stirring.html.
105. See Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance,
supra note 41, at 1749.
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an average holding period of 645 days (approximately twenty-one months)
for their sample of activist interventions in Europe. 106
Activist investors have also been creative in exploiting the gaps of
disclosure regimes, accumulating stakes secretly in target companies and
decoupling risk and equity. Current reporting rules in the United States and
Europe provide a shareholder who has crossed a certain threshold triggering
a disclosure obligation a certain time period before it is required to
announce its presence to the issuer and the market. 107 During this time
period and before any public disclosure is made, a shareholder can continue
accumulating shares—amazingly often an influential stake. 108 A prominent
example was Pershing Square Capital Management’s and Vornado Realty
Trust’s activist intervention in J.C. Penney Company, the U.S. retailer.
Following Pershing Square’s acquisition of an initial stake of 4.9%,
Pershing Square and Vornado Realty Trust amassed a stake reaching 26.7%
through a series of rapid purchases during the ten-day window after
crossing the 5% threshold and before disclosing their presence to the market
by filing a Schedule 13D.109 Taking into account that the disclosure of an
activist’s presence leads to an immediate price spike, an activist has a
strong incentive to exploit the reporting lag and acquire additional shares at
depressed prices, which do not yet reflect information about the activist’s
presence and intentions. For instance, from September 28, 2010, when it
first crossed the 5% threshold until October 7, 2010, when it filed a
Schedule 13D, Pershing Square was able to acquire J.C. Penney shares at an
average price of $29.27, well below the post-disclosure closing price of
$33.30, earning a profit of $193 million.110
Furthermore, innovations in the derivatives market have revolutionized
activist investing, allowing hedge funds to sever the link between share
ownership and economic interest. Hedge fund activists utilize a variety of
cash-settled derivatives instruments to increase their economic ownership,
decoupling it from voting power, with one of the most popular being the
use of cash-settled total return equity swaps. 111 A cash-settled total return
equity swap is a derivative contract that replicates the cash flows of an

106.
107.
108.
109.

See Bebchuk et al. supra note 44, at 10 tbl.2.
See infra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, supra note 21.
See Maxwell Murphy, How Bill Ackman Stalked J.C. Penney, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/10/08/how-bill-ackman-stalked-jc-penney/.
110. See Joshua Mitts, A Private Ordering Solution to Blockholder Disclosure, 35 N.C. CENT.
L. REV. 203, 213 (2013).
111. Other strategies include the use of cash-settled call and put options and single-stock
futures. For an overview of the various strategies, see Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, supra note 20, at 814–48; Wolf-Georg Ringe, Hedge
Funds and Risk Decoupling: The Empty Voting Problem in the European Union, 38 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1027, 1034–38 (2013).
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investment in shares of a company. 112 In a typical swap, the long party
receives the economic returns on a notional amount of shares by the short
party without actually holding them. 113 More specifically, when the
transaction is wound up, the long party is entitled to receive any cash
distributions such as dividends on the referenced shares, plus a cash amount
equal to the market appreciation of the shares.114 The short party on its side
is entitled to receive an amount equal to any depreciation in the market
value of the shares and a negotiated interest rate, as if it had loaned the
notional amount. 115
As a result, the long party obtains economic exposure to the reference
shares without formal ownership. 116 Importantly, the long party may also
have informal voting rights. 117 The short party, usually an investment bank
that seeks to obtain a return from the interest charged on the notional
amount of shares, will typically hedge its exposure by buying the
referenced shares. 118 Holding voting rights, but with no economic exposure,
the short party interested in maintaining a profitable business relationship
has an incentive to cast its vote in support of its client. Furthermore, the
parties may decide to physically settle the swap with the long party,
immediately acquiring the underlying shares from its short counterparties

112. For an excellent and accurate description of total-return equity swaps, see CSX Corp. v.
Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). TCI and 3G
are two hedge funds that secretly accumulated positions in CSX through the use of total equity
return swaps and direct investments, launching a proxy fight against the incumbent directors of
CSX. Id. at 518. CSX filed suit, seeking to prevent the funds from voting the shares acquired and
arguing that TCI and 3G were obliged to disclose their positions and therefore violated the
requirements of section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 538. The U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York deemed TCI to be a beneficial owner of the shares held by
its counterparties according to section 13(d)(3) and on the basis that it had used the swaps in order
to evade the reporting requirements. Furthermore, the court held that TCI and 3G had formed a
group and had failed to disclose their positions ordering them to amend their Schedule 13D filing.
Id. at 573–74. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to issue a
ruling on the issue of whether equity swaps are included in the definition of beneficial ownership
of section 13d(1) and focused on the issue of whether the funds had formed a group under section
13d-3. The court held that more evidence than meetings between the funds alone was required and
remanded the case to the lower court for more evidence-taking. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv.
Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 309–10 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Ian Cuillerier & Claire
Hall, CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP: Disclosure
Requirements in the Context of Total Return Swaps, 31 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. (2011),
available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/8643ad76-fdff-4403-85e1-3f08a3c6e9f8
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/91edabe3-e0ad-4edb-aca1-4639138f7ca1/alerts-TRSDisclosure-Requirements-CSX-Corp.pdf.
113. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 519–20.
114. Id. at 520.
115. Id. at 521.
116. See Hu & Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting
Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, supra note 20, at 344.
117. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
118. See id. at 521–22.
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and therefore emerging as a major blockholder. 119 Until recently, major
jurisdictions did not require the long party to disclose its economic interest.
Although European regulators have amended their disclosure rules in
response to market innovations, 120 cash-settled derivatives still escape
disclosure requirements in the United States. 121
While the empirical evidence strongly indicates that hedge fund
activists are not short-term speculators seeking quick gains at the expense
of long-term value, the ability of activists to accumulate large stakes either
through exploiting pre-disclosure windows or entering into derivatives
transactions clearly undermine market transparency and fairness.122 Indeed,
the purpose of disclosure rules for major shareholders “is to alert the
marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of
securities.” 123
Mandatory disclosure rules seek to promote market efficiency and
improve the corporate governance of companies. 124 The improvements in
market efficiency flow from the increased transparency of the voting
structure and capital movements. 125 Pre-disclosure accumulations and
hidden ownership reduce transparency of the voting structure and changes
in it. The accumulation of shares by short counterparties results in the
shares being held by a party with no economic exposure to the issuer but
the incentive to cast the votes in accordance with the preferences of the long
party. 126 Furthermore, the exploitation of pre-disclosure windows and the
use of cash-settled equity derivatives to build control-threatening stakes
leave the market uninformed of changes in the voting structure. 127 In
addition, these tactics compromise the transparency of trading interest and
the amount of shares that are in the free float. The heightened interest in the
shares remains undisclosed to market participants, while the market may
119. See Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and
Extensions, supra note 20, at 661–81 (reporting instances of decoupling of economic and voting
ownership where derivatives have been used in order to secretly build a stake in a target
company); Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical
Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 460 (2013) (reporting thirteen instances of “hidden ownership” in
a sample of 432 activist campaigns outside the United States between January 1, 2010, and
December 31, 2010).
120. See infra notes 137–145 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 167.
122. Adam O. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law
and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 136, 136 (2013).
123. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971).
124. Michael C. Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 127, 133 (2009); see also EILIS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 127–30
(2004).
125. Schouten, supra note 124, at 166.
126. Id.
127. Maiju Kettunen & Wolf-George Ringe, Disclosure Regulation of Cash-Settled Equity
Derivatives—An Intensions-Based Approach, 2012 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 227, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844886.
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also hold a distorted view of the size of the free float.128 Furthermore, in the
case of hidden ownership, the marketplace is unable to assess the
implications of the long party’s increased economic interest relative to its
voting rights. 129
Apart from undermining market efficiency, pre-disclosure
accumulations during the window left open by disclosure rules and hidden
ownership also have adverse effects on the corporate governance of
companies. 130 Ownership disclosure improves corporate governance by
facilitating market control. Transparency of major holdings allows a
potential acquirer to analyze the size of the free float and persons in control
of the company, as well as identify shareholders with whom the bidder
could cooperate. 131 Furthermore, disclosure of blockholders alerts other
potential bidders that a third party is building a control-threatening stake
and therefore promotes competitive auctions. 132 In addition, the ability of
activists to amass controlling blocks through derivatives and pre-disclosure
accumulations allows them to capture the premium associated with
corporate control without sharing it with their fellow shareholders.133 If an
128. A prominent example was Porsche’s surprise announcement that it had acquired 42.6% of
the stock of Volkswagen and had access to another 31% through cash-settled options. Taking into
account the stake of the German state of Lower Saxony, which amounted to another 20%, the size
of the free float had been reduced to approximately 6%. Hedge funds that were borrowing shares
and selling them short (around 12.8% of Volkswagen’s shares were on loan) immediately rushed
to buy Volkswagen stock in order to close their positions, sending the shares soaring and making
Volkswagen the most valuable company in the world. See Sarah Marsh, Short Sellers Make VW
the World’s Priciest Firm, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/28
/us-volkswagen-idUSTRE49R3I920081028.
129. As Gilson and Gordon note, the long party’s increased economic exposure relative to its
voting leverage reduces the possibility of opportunistic behavior and private benefit extraction by
the activist. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 913. However, the increased economic
interest of the long party may still distort optimal decision-making since the party may be more
risk-averse compared to a shareholder whose economic and voting interests are perfectly aligned.
As a result, the disproportionality between economic and voting interests may influence the firm’s
future cash flows and would therefore be considered as fundamental information by the market.
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
403 (1983); Schouten, supra note 124, at 168.
130. See Schouten, supra note 124, at 168.
131. Id. at 154.
132. Kettunen & Ringe, supra note 127, at 15.
133. For an overview of specific instances where activists have used these tactics to acquire
controlling blocks and launch stealth takeovers, see Pierre Henry Conac, Cash-Settled Derivatives
as a Takeover Instrument and the Reform of the EU Transparency Directive, in THE EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MARKET IN TRANSITION 49–68 (Hanne S. Birkmose et al. eds., 2012); Hu & Black,
Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, supra note 20, at
655–81. However, one should note that activists rarely seek to take control of the target
companies, with their average stake reaching 8.8%, their median only 6.3%, and the ninety-fifth
percentile being 21.2%. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 12. The claims that shareholders in
such instances who sell to the activist before disclosure of the stake and without any information
about its existence or its plans are deprived of a control premium are inaccurate. It is evident that
the activist is not seeking to obtain control, which will permit it to obtain private benefits of
control not shared by the other shareholders. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 51–52.
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activist who has acquired a controlling stake decides to launch a takeover
offer, minority shareholders may be pressured to tender their shares out of
fear that they will be left as minority shareholders in a company under the
control of a new shareholder. 134
III. THE CURRENT REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE OF MAJOR
SHAREHOLDINGS IN THE EU: REFRAMING THE DEBATE
A. THE CURRENT REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE OF MAJOR
SHAREHOLDINGS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Disclosure of major shareholdings in EU companies whose shares are
admitted to trading in a regulated market is governed by the Transparency
Directive. 135 The Directive significantly upgraded the earlier Substantial
Shareholdings Directive, which required a shareholder whose voting rights
reached 10%, 20%, one-third, 50%, and two-thirds of total voting rights to
disclose its interest to the company and the competent authority within
seven calendar days following the acquisition.136
Following calls for more effective and timely disclosure of the structure
of influence in a company, 137 the Transparency Directive substantially
lowered the notification thresholds, shortened the timeframe within which
the disclosure must be made, and included certain derivatives in the
notification requirements. Article 9(1) imposes on shareholders whose
voting rights reach or exceed 5% the obligation to notify the company of
the acquisition within four trading days. 138 The disclosure requirements are
extended to financial instruments that grant the holder under a formal
agreement and on its own initiative the right to acquire shares to which
voting rights are attached to an issuer admitted to trade on a regulated
market. 139 As a result, cash-settled derivatives, including total return swaps
that do not grant the long party the right to purchase shares, did not fall
within the ambit of the Transparency Directive until the recent
amendments.
The minimum harmonization model adopted by the Directive allows
EU Member States to introduce more stringent requirements. 140 In
134. Kettunen & Ringe, supra note 127, at 15.
135. Transparency Directive, supra note 24.
136. Council Directive 88/627/EEC, of the Council of 12 December 1988 on the Information to

be Published when a Major Holding in a Listed Company Is Acquired or Disposed Of, art. 4(1),
1988 O.J. (L 348) 62, 63.
137. NIAHM MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 195 (2008).
138. Transparency Directive, supra note 24, art. 9(1), at 38, 47. The issuer must subsequently
disclose this information to the public within three trading days. Id. art. 12(6).
139. Id. art. 13(1).
140. Member States are free to determine the content of the notification, with some Member
States mandating a declaration of intentions by the shareholder crossing the threshold. For
instance, France requires any shareholder whose ownership interest exceeds 10%, 15%, 20%, or
25% of the shares or voting rights of an issuer to file a declaration of intent with the French
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implementing the Transparency Directive, several Member States opted for
lower disclosure thresholds and shorter notification deadlines. 141 The
United Kingdom requires disclosure of acquisitions above 3% of shares
carrying voting rights in issuers incorporated in the United Kingdom and
admitted to trading on a European Economic Area (EEA)-regulated market
within two trading days. 142 Similarly, Germany and France mandate the
disclosure of shareholdings exceeding 3% and 5% of voting rights
respectively within four trading days. 143 Disclosure of acquisitions above
3% in Spain must be made within four trading days. 144 Following the
outrage provoked by the use of cash-settled derivatives to secretly acquire
controlling stakes in European companies, 145 the majority of European
jurisdictions extended their disclosure requirements to cash-settled
derivatives, including total return swaps not captured by the Transparency
Directive until its recent amendment.
The United Kingdom’s modified disclosure rules include financial
instruments referenced to the issuer’s shares and granting the holder a long
regulator, describing its intentions with respect to the issuer in the six-month period following
notification. It must describe whether the shareholder intends to purchase additional securities,
gain corporate control, or request the appointment of directors. It must also disclose any strategic
plans with respect to the issuer such as a merger, reorganization, or liquidation or a transfer of
material assets. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L.233-7(VII) (Fr.), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000022963037&cidTex
te=LEGITEXT000005634379; Autorité Marchés Financiers, Règlement general art. 223-17(I)(2)
(2012). Rules imposing extensive reporting requirements regarding the intentions of a blockholder
are criticized for exposing the shareholder to considerable liability risk and carrying substantial
enforcement risk since misrepresentations regarding one’s intentions are difficult to detect and
prosecute. See Luca Enriques et al., Mandatory and Contract-Based Shareholding Disclosure, 15
REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME 713, 717 (2010).
141. For an extensive overview of disclosure thresholds and notification deadlines in the
European Union, see FABRICE DEMARIGNY & CHRISTOPHE CLERC, TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE
ASSESSMENT REPORT 112 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs
/transparency/report-application_en.pdf; Andrew Hougie et al., Implementation of the
Transparency Directive Changes Shareholder Notification Requirements Across Europe, 8 J.
INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 63 (2007).
142. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DISCLOSURE RULES AND TRANSPARENCY RULES paras. 5.1.1,
5.1.2 (2014), available at http://media.fshandbook.info/content/full/DTR.pdf.
143. C. COM. art. L.233-7; Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Securities Trading Act], BGBL. I
at 2708, last amended by Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2010/73/EU und zur Änderung des
Börsengesetzes, Aug. 28, 2013, BGBL. I at 3395, § 21 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/bundesrecht/wphg/gesamt.pdf.
144. Transparency Requirements art. XXXV (B.O.E. 2007, 18305) (Spain), available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2007/10/20/pdfs/A42692-42708.pdf.
145. Ed Crooks, Enel Wants Regulator to Speed Up Bid for Endesa, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007,
at 27, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/17d74434-dd6f-11db-8d42-000b5df10621.html
#axzz2ieQI8dix; Haig Simonia, Victory Jitters Strike Swiss Industrialists, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2007, at 24, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/38f9fb00-d5bf-11db-a5c6-000b5df10621
.html#axzz2ieQI8dix; Sarah Spikes, Funds’ Battle with Stork Heats Up, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2006, at 24, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/de36673e-7b60-11db-bf9b0000779e2340.html#axzz2ieQI8dix; Oscar Bodini & Giovanni Legorano, Italian Court Finds
Agnelli’s Advisers Guilty of Market Rigging, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 21, 2013, 9:51 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130221-709691.html.
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position on the economic performance of the shares, whether the instrument
is settled physically in shares or in cash. 146 Holdings of these instruments
are aggregated with any holdings of voting shares in calculating whether the
3% disclosure threshold has been reached. 147 Similarly, Germany extended
its disclosure requirements to financial instruments or other instruments that
merely enable the holder to acquire voting rights. 148 The notification
threshold is set at 5%, and holdings of financial instruments that enable the
holder to acquire voting rights must be aggregated with voting shares and
instruments giving rights to acquire shares. 149 Finally, France also amended
its disclosure rules, mandating the inclusion of any holdings of financial
instruments settled in cash and having for the holder an economic effect
similar to the possession of shares for the purpose of calculating whether
the 5% threshold has been reached. 150
Furthermore, on October 22, 2013, European regulators adopted
amendments to the Transparency Directive.151 The amendments specifically
target the widespread use of financial instruments, giving investors
economic exposure to companies and allowing them to acquire secret stakes
in companies resulting in market abuse.152 Pursuant to the amendments to
the Directive, EU Member States must extend their notification
requirements to financial instruments with economic effects similar to
146. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 142, paras. 5.3.3–.4, 5.8.3.
147. Id. para. 5.8.2(4). Disclosure is made by reference to the delta of the financial instrument

and not the full notional of shares underlying the financial instrument. “Delta” refers to the
number of shares that the writer of an option must hold in order to perfectly hedge its position and
changes over time as the option moves closer to expiration and the price of the referenced shares
varies. The New FSA Rules on Disclosure of Interests in UK Companies, LINKLATERS, 3 (May
2009), http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/capitalmarkets/CFD_disclosurerulesnote.pdf.
148. Securities Trading Act, supra note 143, § 25a. An instrument enables an investor to
acquire voting rights if the counterparty can exclude or lower risk emanating from these
instruments by buying the referenced shares, irrespective of whether the instrument provides for a
cash or physical settlement.
149. Id. The number of voting rights is determined by the amount of shares that the
counterparty would need to hold for a full hedge of its position, assuming a delta of one.
150. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts. L.233-7, -9 (Fr.); France Adopts New Aggregation
Rules, BAKER & MCKENZIE (Oct. 2012), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication
/a07004fa-ab21-4cd4-ac43-147cdebc9cb7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/53fc8fc6-99e7452f-929e-871c68df248d/al_bf_fanceaggregationrules_oct12.pdf. The number of voting rights to
be disclosed is calculated on a delta-adjusted basis. See C. COM. art. L.233-11. Furthermore,
following amendments to the French Commercial Code in 2012, a shareholder whose ownership
interest exceeds 10%, 15%, 20%, or 25% of the shares or voting rights of an issuer as a result of
the use of total return swaps or other cash-settled derivatives must report whether it intends to
acquire the shares bought by its counterparties in order to hedge their short positions or to alter its
agreement with its counterparties and settle the initially cash-settled derivatives in-kind. See id.
art. 233-7(VII)(e).
151. Transparency Directive Amendments, supra note 24. The Directive imposes an obligation
on all Member States to aggregate holdings of voting rights with holdings of financial instruments
in calculating notifiable interests. Although the Directive still allows Member States to set lower
notification thresholds than the minimum thresholds it introduced, they will not be able to impose
different requirements regarding the calculation of aggregation of interests. Id. at 15.
152. Id. at 21.
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instruments that give the holder the right to acquire voting shares, whether
they are physically settled or not. 153 Holdings of financial instruments must
be aggregated with holdings of voting shares in order to determine whether
the disclosure threshold has been reached or exceeded. 154 Furthermore, the
amendments to the Directive provide that long positions cannot be netted
with short positions in the same issuer. 155
B. REFRAMING THE DEBATE
The rules governing disclosure of major shareholdings—both at the
level of individual European countries and at the EU level, including the
recent amendments to the Transparency Directive—respond to the
innovative and opaque tactics of hedge fund activists and serve the
legitimate purpose of safeguarding market transparency and fairness.
Nonetheless, they fail to balance the costs imposed by hedge fund activists
in terms of compromising market transparency with the benefits of activism
for shareholders and companies. Current disclosure rules unfavorably tilt
the balance of power between management and activists against the latter
and have a chilling effect on hedge fund activism in Europe that
substantially lags behind the United States. 156
The emergence of an activist, the size of its block, and its investments
in monitoring depend on its ability to recover its costs and earn an
attractive, risk-adjusted return on its investment. 157 For the activist, an
intervention entails high expenditures on research, increased idiosyncratic
risk arising from its concentrated and illiquid position, and costs associated
with an activist campaign, including costs incurred in connection with a
proxy fight. 158 Furthermore, increased competition between hedge funds
employing different strategies and asset classes for attracting funds requires
activists to offer an attractive return to their investors.
The ability of an activist to recoup its costs and earn a profit on its
investment depends on securing a sizeable stake at prices that do not reflect
153. Id. at 22. The number of voting rights is calculated by reference to the notional amount of
shares underlying the financial instrument unless the financial instrument is cash-settled, in which
case the calculation of the voting rights shall be made on a delta-adjusted basis. The notional
amount of the underlying shares shall be multiplied by the delta of the instrument.
154. Id. at 23.
155. Id. at 22.
156. See Georgina Prodhan & Angelika Gruber, Lonely Activist Investor Pushes Limits in
Austria, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/06/austria-investmentactivist-idUKL6N0GZ2AA20130906 (reporting that while the number of activist campaigns in
the United States has reached 357, only twenty-six have been recorded at European companies).
157. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 49.
158. Gantchev estimates that the costs of an average activist campaign composed of three
separate stages—demand negotiations, board representation, and proxy contest—equal $10.71
million. The proxy contest—involving legal fees, fees of proxy solicitors, and public relations and
advertising expenditures—has the highest cost, reaching $5.94 million. See Gantchev, supra note
55, at 624.
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the expected benefits of the activist’s intervention. 159 Upon disclosure of an
activist’s presence, share prices rise, reflecting the expected value of
increased monitoring and engagement with the target company. 160
Acquiring a sizeable stake allows an activist to capture an increased fraction
of the gains resulting from the stock price appreciation. One should stress
that the activist captures only a fraction of the gains, with the rest of the
gains accruing to other shareholders.
Disclosure rules are crucial for the activist’s ability to recoup its costs
and earn a return on its investments. A low disclosure threshold and a short
period of time for disclosure after the ownership threshold has been reached
reduce the size of the stake that an activist can accumulate before disclosure
drives up the share price and eliminates the activist’s gains. 161 As the
returns of an activist depend on its ability to capture a sizeable proportion of
the share price gains by acquiring a sufficiently large equity stake, reducing
the size of the pre-disclosure block leads to a decrease in the activist’s
returns. 162 Similarly, aggregating holdings of equity derivatives granting
their holder economic exposure to the target company with voting rights for
the purpose of determining the disclosure trigger further reduces the
economic stake that an activist can amass. 163 In some cases the activist will
not be able to recoup its costs and earn a competitive return, therefore
shunning activism altogether, while in other cases, even though the activist
will be able to profit from its investment, its small block will make the
threat of a successful intervention in the target company less credible.
The abovementioned analysis has shown that the current disclosure
regimes at the level of individual European countries—but also at the EU
level—significantly impede activism, depriving shareholders of the superior
returns documented upon the disclosure of an activist’s presence, and
companies and the economy in general of the improvements in operating
performance that activists are able to implement. Furthermore, by making
activism more costly and less frequent, investors will lose the gains arising
from the disciplinary effects of activism. The threat of the emergence of an

159. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 50; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 902;
Andrei Shleifer & Robert. W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL.
ECON. 461 (1986).
160. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 903–04.
161. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 17–19; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 904–06.
162. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 904.
163. Equity derivatives such as total return swaps allow an activist to increase its economic
exposure to the target and gain additional profits from a share price appreciation without
increasing its voting rights. The gains of an activist derive from its ability to build an economic
stake prior to disclosure of its position. Once disclosure of the activist’s economic stake is made,
the share price will spike, reflecting the expected value of the intervention. Counting equity
derivatives towards the disclosure threshold reduces the returns of the activist by reducing its
economic stake. See id. at 914–15.
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activist reduces agency costs by inducing management to improve share
price and operational performance. 164
Gilson and Gordon argue that the genius of the recent campaign urging
the SEC to shorten the time period for disclosure after the threshold has
been reached and include derivatives in the calculation of the relevant
disclosure threshold is the covert imposition of a low threshold poison pill
at a time when shareholders are demanding the dismantling of poison
pills. 165 The regulatory cap on the activist’s ownership stake functions as a
defensive mechanism against activists shielded from shareholder opposition
and imposed on all corporations. Analyzed from this perspective, European
disclosure requirements go even further and directly contravene the spirit
and rationale of the Directive on Takeover Bids. 166 In contrast to the United
States, where the board is allowed to adopt defensive mechanisms without
shareholder approval, 167 defensive measures are banned in Europe unless
the board obtains shareholder approval.168 In essence, European regulators
have created a defensive mechanism targeting solely hedge fund activists.
164. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 20; see also Fos, supra note 1 (documenting that an
increase in the likelihood of a proxy contest is associated with an increase in leverage, dividends,
and CEO turnover at target companies and a decline in research and development, as well as
capital expenditures and executive compensation. Taking into account that proxy contests are
frequently launched by hedge fund activists, the evidence could be interpreted as confirming the
disciplinary effects of hedge fund activism).
165. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 910–12. The poison pill is a popular defensive
mechanism invented by Martin Lipton, a prominent U.S. corporate lawyer. Under the standard
“flip in” pill, the board of directors, by board resolution and without shareholder approval,
distributes rights to existing shareholders, which grant each rightsholder the right to buy additional
shares in the target at a steep discount. The rights are exercisable once an acquirer has
accumulated shares exceeding a specified ownership threshold (usually between ten and twenty
percent). As a result, the triggering of a poison pill severely dilutes the acquirer’s stock ownership
percentage in the target. See John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in
Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytic Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 245–47
(2011). Poison pills are under attack by shareholders, with their number constantly falling during
the last decade. In 2001, 2200 public corporations had poison pills in place. By 2011, fewer than
900 public companies had adopted a poison pill. See Tonello, supra note 52.
166. Council Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April
2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12. The Directive establishes a common framework for
takeover bids in Europe, setting minimum requirements with which EU Member States must
comply.
167. Defensive mechanisms in the United States are regulated by U.S. states and particularly
state courts. Under Delaware law, in the preferred state of incorporation for the majority of large
U.S. public companies, defensive mechanisms are reviewed under the Unocal standard. Under
Unocal, the defensive actions must respond to a reasonable threat to corporate value and policy,
and the defensive mechanisms must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–57 (Del. 1985); see Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651
A.2d 1361, 1373–89 (Del. 1995).
168. Council Directive 2004/25/EC, art. 9, 2004 O.J. (L 142), 12, 19. The ban against defensive
mechanisms and the endorsement of the principle of shareholder choice in respect to takeovers
demonstrate the recognition by European legislations of the beneficial effects of contests for
corporate control. See JAAP WINTER ET AL., REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY
LAW EXPERTS ON ISSUES RELATED TO TAKEOVER BIDS (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf.
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This defensive mechanism against activists significantly impedes
shareholder activism in Europe and deprives shareholders and European
companies of the gains stemming from activism.
While the goal of safeguarding market transparency and fairness is a
legitimate one for European regulators to pursue, a stringent disclosure
regime comes at the cost of a reduction in the incidence of activism and its
beneficial effects. The lowering of disclosure thresholds, tightening of the
time period for disclosure, and the requirement to disclose economic
interests acquired through derivatives were relatively straightforward
exercises for European regulators. The compelling argument in favor of
stringent disclosure rules for major shareholdings was that innovations in
the marketplace had allowed activists to compromise market transparency
by employing sophisticated techniques to quickly accumulate stakes in
target companies. 169 Nonetheless, regulators in Europe have failed to
recognize the beneficial effects of activism, the crucial role that disclosure
rules play in incentivizing activists to engage with target companies, and
the costs that tighter disclosure rules impose upon investors and companies
who are deprived of the documented gains associated with activism. 170
The approach of European regulators can be contrasted with the recent
debate between academics, practitioners, judges, and journalists sparked by
a petition filed by a prominent U.S. law firm, urging the SEC to shorten the
ten-day reporting lag after crossing section 13(d)’s five-percent disclosure
threshold for major shareholdings to one business day following the

169. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., NO. 07/20, DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE:
CONSULTATION AND DRAFT HANDBOOK TEXT ¶ 3.6–.7, at 21–22 (2007) (echoing these concerns,
and specifically the ability of activists to accumulate secret stakes through derivatives).
170. See, e.g., Transparency Directive, supra note 24; see also Commission Directive
2007/14/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 69/27); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation
to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market
and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, No. COM (2011) 683, at 12 (Oct. 25, 2011);
Transparency Directive Amendments, supra note 24, at 14. Even though the initial proposal for
amendments and the adopted amendments to the Transparency Directive explicitly mention that
they have been adopted in response to activists’ innovative techniques enabling them to secretly
accumulate stakes in companies, there is no mention of either the beneficial effects of activism or
the costs of the tightened disclosure rules in terms of a reduction in the incidence of activism.
Similarly, the impact assessment of the Transparency Directive quickly rejects the assertion that
tightened disclosure requirements will chill hedge fund activism and the benefits associated with
it, without engaging in any meaningful empirical analysis. See EUR. COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER: IMPACT ASSESSMENT 66–68 (2011), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2011:1279:FIN:EN:PDF; see also
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 169, at 9 (showing where the British securities regulator engages
in a cost-benefit analysis of its proposed rules for including derivatives in the calculation of the
disclosure threshold). Nonetheless, it provides a rather superficial analysis of the costs of the
tightened disclosure regime in terms of a reduction in the incidence of activism and the gains
associated with it.
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crossing and include derivatives in the definition of beneficial ownership. 171
Following the filing of the petition, the SEC is currently considering
modifying the existing rules for outside blockholders pursuant to the
authority granted to it by sections 766(e) and 929R of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 172 While proponents of the
petition point to the abusive tactics of hedge fund activists and the
destructive effects of activism for market transparency and fairness, 173
opponents stress the beneficial effects of activism and the adverse effects
that tighter disclosure rules will have on the incidence and size of activist
blocks. 174 Furthermore, opponents of the petition urge the SEC to conduct a
careful policy analysis based on empirical evidence of the costs in terms of
a reduction in activism and the benefits of modifying the current disclosure
regime. 175
Nonetheless, the overhaul of European disclosure rules was not
preceded by any policy analysis with academics and regulators, urging the
tightening of disclosure obligations for major blockholders without
recognizing their chilling effect on activism and the foregone profits for
shareholders and companies. In light of the crucial role of disclosure
obligations for activists and the adverse impact of current rules on hedge
fund activism in Europe, European regulators should carefully reconsider
the existing disclosure regime, both at the European and at an individual
country level. The benefits of tighter disclosure rules in terms of improved
market transparency and fairness must be weighed against the costs
imposed on shareholders and companies as a result of a reduction in the
incidences of activist activities. 176
On the one hand, European regulators with the contribution of
European academics should conduct a careful, empirical analysis of the
171. See Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, supra note 21. Section 13(d)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act requires any person who acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of
voting shares to file with the SEC within ten days after the acquisition a Schedule 13D. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-l (2014). A beneficial owner is any person who, directly or indirectly, through
any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has the power to vote or
direct the voting of the relevant securities or the power to dispose or direct the disposition of the
securities. See id. § 240.13d-3. Derivatives are included in the calculation of the 13D disclosure
threshold only if the holder has a right to beneficial ownership over the underlying security within
sixty days. See id. § 240.13d-3(d)(1).
172. See Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, supra note 21; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 766(e), 929R, 124 Stat. 1376, 1797–99, 1866–
67 (2010).
173. See Emmerich et al., supra note 122; Beneficial Ownership, supra note 20; Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Shareholder Democracy Can Mask Abuses, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/shareholder-democracy-can-mask-abuses/.
174. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23; Bebchuk et al., supra note 44; Gilson & Gordon,
supra note 25. One should note that, in contrast to our analysis, opponents of the petition regard
the claims that activist tactics compromise market transparency and fairness as unfounded. See
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 51–55; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 913–15.
175. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 59–60.
176. Id.
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frequency of large-scale accumulations of blocks by activist shareholders in
the European Union through exploitation of pre-disclosure windows or use
of derivatives, as well as the costs imposed by these activities. 177 One
should note that the incidence of empty voting in the European Union may
be actually overstated. 178 On the other hand, they should empirically assess
the benefits of activism for shareholders and companies in Europe and the
costs of tighter disclosure obligations. The empirical analysis will lead to
the adoption of more efficient disclosure obligations for major
blockholders, which will on the one hand safeguard market transparency
and on the other hand allow shareholders and companies to reap the gains
associated with hedge fund activism.
CONCLUSION
The shareholder empowerment movement led by hedge fund activists
has revolutionized modern capital markets and corporate governance. While
activists are criticized as short-term agitators seeking to earn a quick profit,
the empirical evidence univocally confirms the beneficial effects of
activism for shareholders and companies. In response to the abusive tactics
employed by activists seeking to secretly amass blockholdings in target
companies and the adverse effects of such activism on market transparency
and fairness, European regulators have tightened disclosure obligations for
major shareholders. However, regulators in Europe have failed to recognize
177. One should note that in contrast with the United States, empirical research on the effects of
hedge fund activism is still in its early stages. For empirical research concerning activism in
Europe, see Bebchuk et al., supra note 44; Becht et al., Hedge Fund Activism in Europe, supra
note 81; Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism, supra note 81; Wolfgang Bessler et al., The
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism in Germany, 20 EUR. FIN. MGMT. (forthcoming 2014) (finding
that hedge fund activists in Germany increase shareholder value both in the short and the long
term, and that aggressive activism is initially associated with higher returns that are quickly
reversed); Erede, supra note 25 (analyzing hedge fund activism in the context of Italy and
Germany, two corporate systems characterized by concentrated ownership); Peter Weber & Heinz
Zimmermann, Hedge Fund Activism and Information Disclosure: The Case of Germany, 19 EUR.
FIN. MGMT. 1017 (2013) (examining share price reactions upon disclosure of the presence of
activists in Germany); Veronique Bessiere et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Clinical Study of the
French Company Atos Origin (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1635283 (examining the battle between hedge fund activists and the
management of French company Atos Origin); Tilman H. Drerup, Much Ado About Nothing: The
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism in Germany (Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718365 (examining a sample of 278 hedge fund shareholdings in
German-listed companies, documenting positive stock market reactions upon disclosure of the
presence of an activist that are subsequently reversed and finding no significant changes in central
corporate variables such as cash holdings and leverage).
178. The European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) launched a call for evidence in 2011
seeking to collect information on the incidence of empty voting in the European Union and
explore possible regulatory responses to the phenomenon. However, ESMA concluded that there
was not sufficient evidence of empty voting in the European Union to warrant regulatory action.
See EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., FEED-BACK STATEMENT: CALL FOR EVIDENCE ON EMPTY
VOTING 4–5 (2012).
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the crucial role of disclosure obligations in incentivizing activists to engage
with target companies. Current disclosure regimes in Europe tilt the balance
against activists, depriving shareholders and companies of the benefits
emanating from activism. In line with calls by U.S. academics stressing the
necessity of empirical analysis before proceeding with the tightening of
disclosure obligations for major blockholders in the United States, the
present Article urges European regulators to reconsider the current
disclosure regime by conducting a careful, empirical analysis of their
benefits for market transparency and fairness and their costs on
shareholders and companies as a result of a reduction in the incidence of
activist shareholdings.

